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Abstract
The mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which is
characterized by an infrastructureless architecture and
multi-hop communication, has attracted a lot of attention
recently. In the evolution of IP networks to version 6,
adopting the same protocol would guarantee the success
and portability of MANETs. In this paper, we propose a
secure bootstrapping and routing protocol for MANETs.
Mobile hosts can autoconfigure and even change their IP
addresses based on the concept of CGA (cryptographically
generated address), but they can not hide their identities
easily. The protocol is modified from DSR (dynamic
source routing) to support secure routing. The neighbor
discovery and domain name registration in IPv6 are
incorporated and enhanced with security functions. The
protocol is characterized by the following features: (i) it is
designed based on IPv6, (ii) relying on a DNS server, it
allows bootstrapping a MANET with little pre-configuration
overhead, so network formation is light-weight, and (iii) it
is able to resist a variety of security attacks.
Keywords: Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), mobile ad
hoc network (MANET), mobile computing,
network initialization, secure routing, wireless
communication.
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an
infrastructureless network consisting of a set of mobile
nodes that are able to communicate with each other in a
multi-hop manner without the support of any base station
or access point. A node in a MANET is not only a node but
also a router that is responsible of relaying packets for
other nodes. A MANET has the merit that it is quickly
deployable. Applications of MANETs include com-
munications in battlefields, disaster rescue operations, and
outdoor activities.
Routing is essential for a MANET to operate correctly,
and a lot of routing protocols have been proposed in the
literature, including proactive (table-driven), reactive
(demand-driven), and hybrid solutions [3, 6, 14]. Most of
the existing protocols have assumed a MANET as a
nonhostile, trusted environment. Unfortunately, in the
presence of malicious nodes, a MANET is highly
vulnerable to attacks due to its open environment,
dynamically changing topology, and lack of centralized
security infrastructure. To address this concern, several
secure routing protocols have been proposed recently, such
as SAODV [19], SRP [11], SAR [18], CSER [8], BSAR
[2], Ariadne [4], and SEAD [5].
This article intends to present a secure bootstrapping
and routing protocol for an IPv6-based MANET. We
envision that IPv6 would be more widely deployed and
accepted in the next stage. Adopting IPv6 in MANETs
would warrant the success and portability of MANETs. In
particular, the important address autoconfiguration feature
in IPv6 should be adopted so that mobile nodes do not need
predefined IP addresses before entering a MANET. This
would greatly facilitate the formation of a MANET in an
open environment. However, hosts should not be able to
hide their identities (i.e., IP addresses) when doing
something bad; otherwise, a lot of routing misbehaviors
may happen. Further, while securing the network is
essential, mobile nodes should maintain very limited
pre-knowledge for this purpose.
In our design, we rely on the existence of an IPv6
DNS server in the MANET for the security purpose. For
those hosts who intend to prevent the impersonation attack,
they have to establish their IP-domain name mappings in
the DNS server prior to network formation. Alternatively,
the mapping can be established on-line, but in this case the
domain names/IP addresses are taken in a first-come-
first-serve manner. Even so, our approach still guarantees
that a host can not arbitrarily claim the ownership of an IP
address. For hosts with a stronger security demand, they
can check with the DNS the IP address of a domain name
before conducting communications. For hosts with a
weaker security demand, they do not need to contact DNS,
but the secure address autoconfiguration can still ensure, toJournal of Internet Technology Volume 5(2004) No.2 124
a certain degree, the identities of their communication
counterparts. In our design, a host only needs to know the
public key of the DNS server to achieve the above goals.
Via such a mechanism, we further propose our secure
routing protocol such that the identities of all hosts alone a
routing path can be verified. Thus, misbehaving hosts can
be easily tracked, and thus routed around if necessary. We
also propose how to assign credits to hosts depending on
how reliable they relay packets in the past. Thus, trusted
routes can be established after the network is run for a
while.
The proposed secure routing protocol is derived based
on the DSR protocol [6]. The protocol incorporates the
concept of CGA (cryptographically generated address) [1],
address autoconfiguration [12], and DNS autoregistration
[12] and discovery [7] of IPv6. It allows the network to be
bootstrapped without manual administration and can resist
a variety of attacks, including the black hole,
impersonation, replay, and message forging attacks. In
comparison, most existing works are not directly targeted
at IPv6 networks, and they usually assume stronger
security associations among hosts prior to the network
formation. Our work only relies on the existence of a DNS
server in the MANET, and a host only needs to know the
public key of the DNS server prior to entering the MANET.
Thus, the network formation and bootstrapping is quite
light-weight.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some
backgrounds are given in Section 2. Our proposal is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes how our
protocol prevents some attacks. Conclusions are drawn in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Review of Secure Routing Protocols
In a MANET, two security issues need to be
addressed: one is to protect transmitted data and the other
is to make the routing protocol secure. The former can be
done through end-to-end protection and has been well
addressed in wired networks. The latter is particularly
challenging for MANETs with dynamically changing
topologies. If we have a MANET whose members are a
“ t e a m ”   a n d   k n o w   a   p r i o r i   a   “ t e a m -k e y ” ,   t h i s   i s   n o t   a   b i g  
problem. However, if we want to create a MANET where
everybody can participate, secure routing is necessary
because there is no way to enforce everybody to be honest.
The SAODV (Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance
Vector Routing) protocol [19] is an extension of AODV
[16]. Adversary nodes may forge AODV packets, listen to
others, reply packets in their own interests, and report
errors where there are none. To defend these attacks, it is
assumed that each node has a certified public key.
Hop-by-hop authentication is used to protect routing
messages, and all intermediate nodes need to
cryptographically validate the digital signatures appended
with a routing message.
Assuming the existence of a security association
between each pair of source and destination nodes, the SRP
(Secure Routing Protocol) [11] guarantees that fabricated,
compromised, or relayed route replies would either be
rejected or never reach back the querying source.
Compared to SAODV, the verification is not needed for
intermediate nodes, thus removing the overheads. The
security association can be obtained via the knowledge of
t h e   c o m m u n i c a t i o n   c o u n t e r p a r t ’ s   p u b l i c   k e y .   S R P   i s   r o b u st
in the presence of misbehaving nodes, and provides
accurate routing information in a timely manner.
The SAR (Security-Aware Routing) protocol [18]
incorporates security attributes as parameters in route
discovery. SAR ensures that a route only consists of nodes
at the same trusted level. However, such routes may not
always exist. The CSER (Cooperative Security-
Enforcement Routing) protocol [8] allows a path consisting
of multiple segments, each starting and ending by nodes
from the same security domain as the source node. The
middle of each segment can contain untrusted nodes. The
trust relationship among nodes is established at
configuration time and all nodes in the same security
domain must abide by a formal security policy and can
assure a certain level of security. By such cooperative
enforcement, CSER can effectively locate misbehaving
nodes in a segment, and route around hostile areas.
SEAD [5] assumes a shared key among all nodes in
the network and uses hash chain to authenticate relayed
messages. The protocol builds on top of a proactive routing
protocol, which is believed to be more costly than a
reactive protocol. Ariadne [4] tries to make DSR secure. It
requires one of the following key setups to authenticate the
sender of a message: (1) a pairwise shared key among all
nodes, (2) a system-wide distributed public key for each
node, and (3) a public TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream
Loss-tolerant Authentication) key for each node. Key
setups (1) and (2) are expensive. While setup (3) is not so
expensive, time synchronization among nodes is a
prerequisite for this case.
The aforementioned protocols all assume the
existence of some security associations among hosts,
which must be pre-established or established on-line. This
poses difficulty in a MANET. The BSAR protocol [2] is
developed on top of SUCV (statistically unique and
cryptographically verifiable) identifiers [9], which ensure a
secure binding between IP addresses and keys without
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distributed center (KDC). The concept of SUCV identifiers
is similar to that of CGAs, which will be reviewed in
Section 2.3. BSAR adopts DSR to discover new routes and
allows a source node to verify the identity of the host who
initiated a route reply or route error message. As compared
to our work, we enhance BSAR by allowing a host to
verify the identity of every host in a route, and thus a
variety of attacks can be avoided.
2.2 IPv6AddressAutoconfiguration
In IPv6, there are two ways for a node to configure its
address: stateful and stateless. Stateless configuration is
more suitable for MANETs with a dynamic,
infrastructureless architecture. In stateless auto-
configuration, to obtain an IP address, a node has to
generate a link-local address and then run the duplicate
address detection (DAD) procedure of the Neighbor
Discovery Protocol (NDP) [10]. In DAD, a node verifies
the uniqueness of its link-local address by broadcasting a
NS (neighbor solicitation) message to neighboring nodes.
Any node with the same address as the announced
link-local address should reply with a NA (neighbor
advertisement) message to enforce the former to choose a
new address and retry DAD.
For multi-hop MANETs, DAD verification of
link-local addresses is insufficient to guarantee address
uniqueness because the same addresses may be used by
hosts that are several hops away. Reference [12] proposes
to extend DAD by using routable site-local addresses. An
extended DAD scheme is proposed in [15] for MANETs
by requiring a node to flood an address request (AREQ)
message and then wait for a potential address reply (AREP)
message. Thus, AREQ and AREP are extensions of NS and
NA, respectively. If an AREQ initiator does not receive an
AREP after a specific period of time, it assumes that its
address is unique and can be used for communication
afterwards.
2.3 IPv6 Secure Neighbor Discovery via CGAs
IPv6 allows a host to autoconfigure its own address.
In an open environment like MANET, a host may easily
i m p e r s o n a t e   a n o t h e r   h o s t ’ s   a d d r e s s .   A   f e w   w o r k s have
addressed how to secure the neighbor discovery protocol.
In [1], the cryptographically generated addresses (CGAs)
are defined to make NS and NA massages verifiable in the
absence of a centralized security infrastructure. A CGA is
also known as a SUCV (statistically unique and
crytographically verifiable) address [9]. The basic idea of
C G A s   i s   t o   a s s o c i a t e   a   h o s t ’ s   a d d r e s s   w i t h   i t s   p u b l i c   k e y   i n  
order for other hosts to verify the ownership of the address
by the host. It is assumed that a node owns a public-private
key pair (PK, SK) and there is a publicly known one-way,
collision-resistant hashing function H. While the upper part
o f   a   h o s t ’ s   I P   a d d r e s s   s h o u l d   f o l l o w   s o m e   s u b n e t   m a s k i n g  
rules, the lower part must consist of the hashing result
H(PK, rn), where rn is a random number to avoid possible
collisions. Afterwards, the host can send messages, such as
NS and NA, with PK and rn attached. A receiving host can
then verify the originality (i.e., IP address) of the sending
host. Therefore, a host can not impersonate another host by
t a k i n g   t h e   l a t t e r ’ s   I P   a d d r e s s   u n l e s s   i t   c o m p r o m i s e s   S K .
2.4 IPv6 DNSAuto-registration and Discovery
IP addresses are usually too long to remember; logical
domain names are sometimes more preferable, especially
for human. For a node to resolve names of others nodes,
DNS servers are used. Three well-known site local IPv6
addresses are reserved for auto-discovery of DNS servers
[17]. They are fec0:0:0:ffff::1, fec0:0:0:ffff::2, and
fec0:0:0:ffff::3.
To verify the uniqueness of domain names, the
6DNAR (IPv6 Domain Name Auto-Registration) protocol
[13] proposes to incorporate domain name registration into
t h e   D A D   p r o c e d u r e   o f   N D P .   A   n e w   “ d o m a i n   n a m e ”   o p t i o n  
is added in NS messages, through which a node can
announce its domain name together with its IP address. As
s u c h ,   t h e   u n i q u e n e s s   o f   d o m a i n   n a m e s   a n d   I P ’ s   c a n   b e  
verified altogether. NA messages are also modified so as to
announce duplicate domain names as well as IP addresses.
3 Secure Bootstrapping and Routing in
a MANET
In this section, we present our secure bootstrapping
and routing protocol in a MANET. The design basically
follows the philosophy of IPv6. The following assumptions
are made.
There is a publicly known one-way, collision-resistant
hashing function H, and there exists an IPv6 DNS server
in the MANET. The DNS server has a public-private
key pair, and the public key has been securely
distributed to all mobile nodes prior to network
formation.
For a mobile host which intends to own a permanent
domain name, an entry (domain name, IP address)
should have been placed at the DNS server before the
network is formed. In this case, impersonating such
hosts would be impossible.
For a mobile node which dose not intend to own a
permanent domain name, its (domain name, IP address)
entry can be registered with the DNS server online after
the network is formed. We adopt the first-come-
first-serve policy for registration of new domain names.
(However, for a mobile host which only wants to be aJournal of Internet Technology Volume 5(2004) No.2 126
Table 1 Control messages used in our protocol
Type Function Parameters
AREQ Address REQuest (SIP, seq, DN, ch, RR)
AREP Address REPly (SIP, RR, [SIP, ch]RSK, RPK, Rrn)
DREP DNS server REPly (SIP, RR, [DN, ch]NSK)
RREQ Route REQuest (SIP, DIP, seq, SRR, [SIP, seq]SSK,
SPK, Srn)
RREP Route REPly (SIP, DIP, [SIP, seq, RR]DSK, DPK,
Drn)
CREP Cached route REPly (S IP , SIP, DIP, RRS →S , [S IP, seq ,
RRS →S ]SSK, SPK, Srn,[SIP, seq,
RRS →D]DSK, DPK, Drn)
RERR Route ERRor (IIP , I IP , [IIP , I IP]ISK, IPK, Irn)
client, establishing a domain name is not always
necessary.)
Our protocol uses several control messages, whose
formats and parameters are summarized in Table 1 and
Table 2, respectively.
3.1 SecureAddressAuto-configuration
In this section, we introduce how a mobile host
securely configures an IPv6 address and verifies its
uniqueness in a MANET. The proposed solution is an
integration and modification of the ideas in CGA [1],
extended DAD [15], and 6DNAR [13].
To join a MANET, a host must obtain an IPv6
site-local address. This address is composed of four fields:
a 10-bit site-local prefix fec0::/10, a 38-bit all-zero field, a
16-bit subnet ID, and a 64-bit hash value, as illustrated in
Figure 1. In particular, the last 64-bit hash value H(PK, rn)
is generated based on the concept of CGA, where rn is a
random number to avoid possible collisions. The subnet ID
makes no sense for a MANET and can be replaced by the
gateway when the node is connecting to the Internet. Here
we assume the 16-b i t   s u b n e t   I D   t o   b e   a l l   0 ’ s .   S o   t h e  
site-local address is fec0::H(PK, rn). Such a design has two
advantages. First, an adversary cannot arbitrarily claim the
ownership of an IP address unless it finds a proper pair
(PK , rn ) such that H(PK , rn ) = H(PK, rn). Even if the
(PK , rn ) pair is correct, the adversary may be challenged
to prove its ownership of the corresponding SK , which is
difficult. Second, normal users may occasionally find
collisions in the hashing results. So the random number rn
provides a way to generate a new IP address while PK is
kept unchanged.
After generating a new IP address, the host can verify
its uniqueness and, if desired, register with the DNS server
its domain name. We integrate the extended DAD and
6DNAR to achieve this goal. The NS and NA messages in
the original DAD are extended to AREQ and AREP
messages, respectively. The former can only reach one-hop
neighbors, while the latter can be flooded to the MANET.
All hosts will help verify the uniqueness of the IP address,
and the DNS will verify the uniqueness of the IP
address-to-domain name binding.
To perform the DAD procedure, a node S broadcasts
an address request AREQ(SIP, seq, DN, ch, RR). DN can
be left empty if registration of a domain name is not
desired. Every host should help verify the possible
collision of SIP with its own IP address and properly
rebroadcast the AREQ. Duplicate AREQs will not be
rebroadcast. When rebroadcasting AREQ, the host should
append its address to the route record RR. When a node R
receives an AREQ with SIP equal to its own IP address, it
unicasts
** an address reply AREP(SIP , RR, [SIP , ch]RSK,
RPK, Rrn) to S along the reverse direction of RR. When S
with a pending address request receives the AREP message,
it authenticates the integrity of the message as follows:
1. It verifies if the lower part of SIP matches H(RPK, Rrn).
2. It decrypts [SIP, ch]RSK by RPK and verifies if the
decrypted result matches [SIP, ch], where ch is the
c h a l l e n g e   s e n t   i n   S ’ s   e a r l i e r   A R E Q .
**
Note that in the last hop when AREP is transmitted to S, the packet should
be modified as a broadcast since S does not even have a legal IP address
yet to receive packets.
H( )
 768bits
PK rn
16 bits 10 bits
1111 1110 11
38 bits
0 0 0     … H(PK, rn) 0 0 0   …
site-local prefix all zeros subnet ID link-local address
64 bits
Figure 1 The CGAsite-local IPv6 address
Table 2 Definitions of symbols and notations
Symbol Description
XIP IP address of node X
XSK private key of host X
XPK public key of host X
Xrn the random number used by host X to hash its IP
address
DN domain name
ch a random number used as a challenge
seq a unique sequence number generated by a
message initiator
RR route record to keep track of hosts traversed by
AREQ/RREQ
SRR secure route record (similar to RR except that
i n f o r m a t i o n   i s   a d d e d   t o   v e r i f y   e a c h   h o s t ’ s  
identity in the list)
[msg]XSK the ciphertext of message msg encrypted by host
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The first step verifies that R does follow the CGA rule to
generate its IP address. The second step ensures that R
does own the corresponding private key RSK for the public
key RPK. The inclusion of ch in AREQ serves as a
c h a l l e n g e   t o   R ,   w h i l e   R ’ s   c o r r e c t l y   e n c r y p t i n g   ch serves as
a   r e s p o n s e   t o   S ’ s   c h a l l e n g e .   R a n d o m l y   s e l e c t i n g   ch in each
AREQ prevents replay attack. If both checks pass, the
AREP message is considered valid, and S should generate
a new IP address (with a new rn) and restart the DAD
procedure again.
On detecting a duplicate IP address, host R should
also unicast an AREP to DNS to warn DNS to not create a
domain name-IP address entry for S. Again, the DNS can
verify the AREP with the same checks as above. The only
difference is that the challenge ch was issued by S. So the
DNS should keep a copy of the ch associated with the
AREQ that registered with it for a while for such secure
duplication checking purpose. Figure 2 illustrates an
example for the above procedure.
When a DNS server N receives an AREQ with a
conflict domain name DN in its database, it unicasts a
DREP(SIP , RR, [DN, ch]NSK) message to S. When S
receives the DREP, it authenticates the message by
decrypting [DN, ch]NSK  w i t h   D N S ’ s   p u b l i c   k e y   N PK and
compare the result with [DN, ch] that it initiated recently.
If the verification passes, S should choose another domain
n a m e   a n d   r e t r y   D A D .   A g a i n ,   N ’ s   c o r r e c t l y   e n c r y p t i n g   ch
s e r v e s   a s   a   r e s p o n s e   t o   S ’ s   c h a l l e n g e .
If S receives no AREP or DREP after sending out an
AREQ within a predefined period of time, it assumes that
its address SIP and domain name DN is unique. Similarly, if
DNS receives no AREP after receiving an AREQ within a
predefined period of time, it assumes that SIP are unique
and stores (DN, SIP ) in its domain name table.
3.2 Secure DNS Services
L e t ’ s   c o n s i d e r   t h e   s c e n a r i o   t h a t   i n   a n   o u t d o o r   a c t i v i t y ,  
we would like to establish a public server (such as
yahoo.com) to provide services. If so, the corresponding
domain name-IP address mapping should have been
pre-established in the DNS. Our protocol requires each
host know the public key of the DNS before entering the
MANET. So a host can securely inquire the IP address of
the web server via any well known secure communication
protocol. Other hosts can not arbitrarily claim owning the
s e r v e r ’ s  I P  a d d r e s s  d u e  t o  o u r  s e c u r e  a d d r e s s  
auto-configuration protocol in Section 3.1 (otherwise, the
impersonating host will be challenged of owning the
corresponding private key to generate the IP address).
Once owning a domain name-IP address mapping in
the DNS, a host can also request to change its IP address if
necessary. Since we bind each IP address with a
public-private key pair, the DNS can challenge the host
which intends to change its IP address whether it does own
the corresponding private key. Specifically, a challenge ch
can be initiated by the DNS, and the replier, say X, must
present its old IP address XIP and new IP address X IP ,
together with Xrn(the random number to generate the old IP
address), X rn(the random number to generate the new IP
address), XPK, and [XIP, X IP, ch]XSK. Note that the host
does not need to change to a new key pair. The verification
is similar to the earlier procedure, and correctly decrypting
[XIP, X IP, ch] means that X does own the secret key XSK.
After the verification, the DNS can switch to the new X IP.
3.3 Secure Route Discovery
Next, we present our route discovery protocol. The
protocol is derived based on the DSR protocol [6]. For a
source node S to search for a route to a destination D, it
broadcasts a route request RREQ(SIP, DIP, seq, SRR, [SIP,
seq]SSK, SPK, Srn). On receiving the message for the first
time, each intermediate node I attaches its identity
information to the route record SRR:
SRR := SRR|([IIP , seq]ISK, IPK, Irn)
and rebroadcasts the RREQ. The information in SRR
a l l o w s   u s   t o   v e r i f y   I ’ s   i d e n t i t y .   Wh e n   D   r e c e i ves the RREQ,
it first verifies the correctness of the route as follows:
1. Check the validity of the source host by verifying: (i)
if the lower part of SIP is equal to H(SPK, Srn), and (ii)
if the decrypted result of [SIP, seq] SSK by SPK is equal
to [SIP, seq].
2. Check the validity of each intermediate host I in SRR
by verifying: (i) if the lower part of IIP is equal to
H(IPK, Irn), and (ii) if the decrypted result of [IIP,
seq]ISK by IPK is equal to [IIP, seq].
The above checks are similar to the above DAD procedure,
which binds to how IP addresses are generated. Passing the
checks implies that the source S and each intermediate
Figure 2 The secure DAD procedure to detect duplicate IP addresses
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node I are as they claimed. Then D unicasts a route reply
RREP(SIP, DIP [SIP, seq, RR]DSK, DPK, Drn) to S along the
reverse direction of RR, where RR is the route record
e x t r a c t e d   f r o m   S R R   c o n t a i n i n g   t h e   i n t e r m e d i a t e   n o d e s ’   I P  
addresses.
When S with a pending RREQ receives the RREP, it
verifies the message by checking: (i) if the lower part of
DIP is equal to H(DPK, Drn), and (ii) if the decrypted result
of [SIP, seq, RR]DSK by DPK is equal to [SIP, seq, RR]. If
both checks pass, the RREP message is considered valid
and S can start sending data packets to D via this route.
S can also cache the discovered route RR for future
use. For example, when another host S intends to find a
route to D and the RREP is received by S, S can directly
reply a cached route reply CREP(S IP , SIP, DIP, RRS →S ,
[S IP, seq , RRS →S ] SSK, SPK, Srn, [SIP, seq,
RRS →DRRS →D]DSK, DPK, Drn) to S , where RRS →S and
RRS →D are the routes from S to S and from S to D,
respectively. Note that the sequence number seqis
initiated by S , while seq was initiated earlier by S when
searching for a route to D. The verification of the route at
S is similar to the earlier procedure. Figure 3 illustrates the
transmission of RREQ, RREP, and CREP messages.
3.4 Secure Route Maintenance and Credit Management
While transmitting data packets, if an intermediate
node I finds that its connection to its next hop I is broken,
it can send a route error message RERR(IIP, I IP, [IIP, I IP]ISK,
IPK, Irn) to S. Again, the packet allows S to verify that the
packet is sent from I. Under normal situations, S simply
accepts the route error report and runs the route discovery
procedure again to search for a new route. However, if the
problem persists (i.e., S keeps on encountering that routes
are either unusable or short-lived), S needs to determine if
some nodes are malicious. S can collect the routes that it
has found recently but encountered route breakage. If
RERR messages are reported by the same host with a
particularly high frequency, the RERR reporting node or
the node next to the reporting node might be a hostile node.
In this case, S should try to route around the hostile area. A
hostile node may keep on changing its identity, which is
allowed in IPv6. So S may not be able to find a node with a
particularly high RERR reporting frequency. In this case,
we suggest that S can maintain a credit for each host that
has relayed data packets for it. Whenever a data packet is
correctly acknowledged by D, the credit of each host in the
route is increased by one. A new node should be given a
low credit. If a host is found to misbehave, its credits are
decreased by a very large amount. In a highly hostile
environment, S should try to choose a route in which all
hosts exhibit high credits.
Another frequently seen problem is the black hole
problem, where a host simply accepts packets without
forwarding them. Since hosts can not hide their identities
in our protocol, the source host can traverse the route and
test the integrality of each host. In this way, misbehave
hosts are likely to be discovered.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss several possible attacks
and how our protocol defends such attacks.
Impersonation of DNS: A host may want to impersonate
a   D N S   o r   r e p l a y   D N S ’ s   e a r l i e r   m e s s a g e s .   S i n c e   w e  
i m p o s e   t h a t   e v e r y   h o s t   k n o w s   D N S ’ s   p u b l i c   k e y   p r i o r   t o  
entering the MANET, such attacks can be easily
defended by conventional authentication schemes (such
as attaching a challenge in DNS query and response
messages).
Black hole attack: A malicious node may announce
having good routes leading to all other hosts and thus
attract all hosts choosing it as a relay node. When data
packets arrive, the host may simply ignore them, thus
causing the black hole problem. As discussed earlier,
hosts can not easily hide their identities in our protocol.
Further, with our credit management mechanism, such
attacks are unlikely to succeed after the network is
stable.
Replayed or Forged AREP/DREP/RREP/CREP:
Replaying AREP/DREP/RREP/CREP is unlikely
because the attackers have to know how to encrypt
either the challenge or the sequence number. An
adversary can not forge a AREP/DREP/RREP/CREP
because it does not know the private key of the host
which it intends to pretend.
Replayed or Forged RERR: Since we adopt source
routing, a host can not easily forge a RERR unless it is a
node in the routing path. Again, it has to present its
identity to the source on reporting the RERR. In this
case, the source has to accept this report because even if
this is a false report, it still makes no sense to ask this
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malicious host to relay packets. However, if the
malicious host keeps on conducting such attacks, its
identity will be tracked by the initiator. A replay of
RERR is only possible after the corresponding route has
been announced broken for at least once. In this case,
replay attacks make no sense.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a secure
bootstrapping and routing protocol for an open MANET
that may be exposed to attacks. Our design bundles the
generation of IPv6 addresses with the routing protocol so
that a malicious node must present its identity when
conducting routing attacks. Even though IPv6 allows a
malicious host to keep on changing its identity, our credit
management mechanism will discourage a host to choose
routes passing low-credit or hostile areas. In particular, we
adopt DSR as the basis of our routing protocol. This allows
us to easily track the identities of misbehaving nodes.
(Translating to other routing protocols is possible, but we
may lose such tracking capability, which deserves further
investigation.) Our protocol adopts DNS as the only
security infrastructure in a MANET; therefore, maintaining
a MANET would become an easy job. However, hosts do
not need to always contact DNS unless it intends to play as
a server with a permanent domain name.
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